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(i) NEOCONSERVATIVE STRUCTURES OF FEELING 
One of the  guiding critical orthodoxies of our time is that it is readers, rather than authors, who 
determine the meanings of literary fiction. This is only partly true, of course, because the terms on 
which readers are free to determine the meanings of a novel such as Cormac McCarthy’s The Road 
are always necessarily hedged and circumscribed by the positions they occupy in the networks of 
power and contingency that condition the circumstances in which they read. Readers, just like 
writers and novels, are historically produced, and the freedom they enjoy to make meaning out of 
fiction is unavoidably enmeshed in, or in tension with, the lived ideologies and structures of feeling 
shaping their time. The political hegemony in the United States in the years after 9/11, and the 
dominant structures of feeling of the period, are neoconservative—an insurgent ideology whose 
intellectual and political histories overlap with, but are distinct from, the main currents of American 
conservatism, and whose doctrinal precepts and policy-recommendations are refined and codified, 
in their post-9/11 forms, during the 1990s. This essay will suggest that in a reading environment 
weighted down by the neoconservative hegemony of the time, when considered at the level of 
affect—as politics enacted at the level of feeling, or as ideology experienced at a level that is prior to 
articulation in language—the act of reading The Road might well have worked for some readers as a 
powerful affirmation of post-9/11 neoconservatism. This suggestion that McCarthy’s prose in The 
Road might embody, disseminate and assist in the naturalising of neoconservative structures of 
feeling is not, then, a claim about authorial intent. Rather, this essay is interested in the reception of 
McCarthy’s work, or at least the range of possible receptions by readers—the political uses, 
conscious or otherwise, to which contemporary readers might put McCarthy’s prose—in a specific 
historical time and place as a metabolising of historical experience, or lived ideology, in the form of 




 “Structure of feeling” is a category first used by Raymond Williams during the 1950s in an 
attempt to elaborate older, more rigid understandings of ideology inherited from the Marxian 
tradition. In Williams, a structure of feeling connotes a set of values, beliefs and perceptions that are 
widely shared by and within a particular generation, with varying degrees of commitment or self-
awareness. For the most part, the phrase implies values that are affective; values that are felt, rather 
than values that are cognitively known; values that are sensed or intuited as part of daily, lived 
experience, rather than values that are coherently or systematically articulated. When Williams uses 
the phrase, “structure of feeling,” he is talking very specifically about the now, about the present, 
and about how we process the world as we encounter it in an open-ended stream of immediate 
experience. Structures of feeling, for Williams, are “social experiences in solution” (133). They 
articulate values that, by definition, are still emerging, still forming, still coming into being, 
commitments and beliefs that are often inchoate, incomplete, ambiguous, provisional and open-
ended. With structures of feeling, as he puts it, we are dealing with human experience at the “very 
edge of semantic availability” (134), experience that is prior to its own explicit codifying not just by 
language, but also by ideology.  
The neoconservative narrative about 9/11 and the war on terror is itself an account that is 
grounded in affect; or, at least, it is a version of historical events that positions 9/11 on the very 
edge of semantic and cognitive availability. In his address to Congress on September 20 2001, the 
speech in which he declares “war on terror” and formally establishes the hegemonic account of the 
attacks, President Bush presents 9/11 as an inexplicable, motiveless, irrational, surprise attack, a 
moment of apocalyptic violence that cannot be processed cognitively because the attacks have no 
clear intellectual cause or rationale, and certainly no political agenda, beyond what the President 
describes as blind hatred of the American way and a feral “will to power” (Bush). It is an account of 
9/11 that is at odds with the detailed lists of contexts, grievances and rationales supplied by those 
who directed the attacks, and one that has been widely contested by political scientists and 




widespread resentments caused by generations of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in Asia and the 
Middle East. It is this fetishizing of the attacks, nonetheless, this lifting of 9/11 out of history, this 
sealing of Ground Zero from the complex geopolitical agendas that develop over decades and that 
converge on September 11 2001, that is at the heart of the hegemonic, neoconservative narrative 
about 9/11 and the war on terror. 
Abstracted thus from their political and historical contexts, the 9/11 attacks emerge in 
neoconservative discourse as events inscribed solely by narratives of inexplicable American 
victimhood and trauma. As well as enabling the neoconservative war on terror, this iconography of 
inexplicable wounding also seals Ground Zero against other possible appropriations or accounts by 
encouraging Americans to feel 9/11, rather than to think about or explain it. Lacking the historical or 
geopolitical contexts in which we might situate the attacks—lacking, we might say, a cognitive or 
intellectual map with which to explain and understand 9/11—the neoconservative narrative is 
governed instead by a politics of affect, a calculated appeal to feeling, to the gut, to those sensations 
driving horror, anger, fear or loathing, followed then by a structuring or steering of these affects into 
doctrinal narratives about transcendent national mission and redemptive military violence in a 
moment of profound historical rupture. In a world transformed by apocalyptic terror, the old rules 
no longer apply. On the evening of September 11 2001, as the President puts it in his address to 
Congress, “night fell on a different world” (Bush). The old order has gone. In its place, new guides to 
conduct, new moralities and new rules of engagement may legitimately be framed. It is an account 
of traumatic terror and existential threat that chimes harmoniously enough with the resolutely 
opaque and inexplicable apocalypse in The Road, an event similarly characterised by an absence of 
clear contexts or causes, by the displacement of intellect by sentiment, and by the presentation of 
circumstances in which new guides to moral conduct must necessarily take the place of values and 
actions that are now obsolete.   
In this respect—in the opaque and inexplicable nature of McCarthy’s apocalypse—The Road 




its Greek usage (apokalypsis) invokes a moment of “revelation” in which previously hidden truths are 
uncovered or unveiled. By shining a generic revelatory light on the destructive or self-destructive 
qualities of a given society, the aesthetic figuring of the end of the world allows us to see clearly, 
perhaps for the first time, truths about society that might otherwise remain hidden or obscure. As 
James Berger puts it, apocalypse narrative “must in its destructive moment clarify and illuminate the 
true nature of what has been brought to an end” (5), with the existing world “so suffused with moral 
rottenness and technological, political and economic chaos … that it should end and must end” (7).2 
Perhaps the most striking facet of McCarthy’s apocalypse, when it is situated generically in this way, 
is that it does none of these things. If anything, The Road appears actively to refuse the moment of 
“revelation” that lies at the core of centuries of apokalypsis. Readers who come to the novel looking 
for a revelatory light shone brightly on the causes of the end of the world will be disappointed. There 
is no clear or overt indictment of technology, or capitalism, or moral rottenness of any obvious kind, 
no clear causal links established between destructive forces peculiar to the old world and the 
desolation of the new. It has become conventional to see the end of the world in The Road as an 
environmental cataclysm, or as a meteor strike, or as a nuclear holocaust, and readers will assert 
these causes with varying degrees of confidence and certainty. But the thing that makes each of 
these different speculative readings possible is that the novel, in the end, simply refuses to tell. 
Where, generically, we might expect to find the clarifying light of revelation, in The Road we find 
only a hermeneutic murkiness, an apocalypse that is sufficiently dense, opaque and unreadable to 
have made speculation about its causes a perennial issue in critical discussion of the book.  
In place of a cognitive or intellectual response to catastrophe, highlighting causes, contexts 
and explanations, like neoconservative narrative about 9/11 the literary power of The Road seems 
essentially visceral or sentimental, with the focus falling, throughout, on the terror of the child and 
the father’s emotive processing of that terror. This sentimental power is fuelled in part by the access 
the reader is sporadically granted, unusually in McCarthy, to the interiority of a central protagonist—




consciousness presented to us quite directly, at times, in fragments of memory, in his dwelling on 
moments of lost plenitude, in the anticipation of his own death, and above all in his feelings for and 
about the child.3 These feelings provide the two key affective arcs of the novel—the spiralling terrors 
of the boy, and the mounting dread of the father—as well the textual pillars on which a traumatic 
relationship of affects might be built with the reader, with this relationship then reinforced in 
McCarthy’s style. The older he becomes, the more McCarthy’s prose recalls the affective realism of 
the young Hemingway, whose experimental early work sometimes lurches in similar fashion from a 
dominant third-person voice to fleeting moments or sustained passages of interiority, with an 
additional correlative to the late McCarthy in Hemingway’s withholding not only of extraneous 
detail, but also, at times, of detail that we might otherwise depend upon to inform or guide our 
responses to the experience of protagonists.4 Famously, Hemingway claimed that the affective 
charge of his prose was secured partly through omitting such guidance, with dialogue, 
characterisation and diegesis presented in such a way that the unvarnished experience of his 
characters was centrally figured in the prose, but often in such skeletal or impressionistic terms that 
in order to make sense of the words on the page the reader had little choice but to introject 
themselves into, and to inhabit empathetically and affectively, the experience of narrators and 
protagonists. “You could omit anything if you knew that you omitted,” Hemingway wrote in A 
Moveable Feast, “and the omitted part would strengthen the story and make people feel something 
more than they understood” (75). “If a writer of prose knows enough about what he is writing 
about,” he reiterated in Death in the Afternoon, “he may omit things that he knows and the reader, 
if the writer is writing truly enough, will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the 
writer had stated them” (192).    
Perhaps we also feel more than we immediately understand, at times, in McCarthy’s own 
affective realism in The Road, an indicative instance of which might be found in the distinctly 
Hemingwayesque exchange between father and son that follows the episode of the wrecked boat on 




the boat have gone, and then opens out into a series of questions about how many people might still 
be alive “somewhere else” (260), “anyplace else” (261). Much in the manner of a classic example 
such as Hemingway’s “Cat in the Rain,” two very different conversations are unfolding in this 
exchange, one of which is a series of literal questions and answers about who is left alive, while the 
other—which is unstated, but forcefully present in the relationship of affects between the reader 
and the boy—articulates the child’s growing anxiety that his father will die, probably soon, and that 
he will be alone in the world. The man, himself, appears only to realise this right at the end of the 
exchange.    
In passages like these, McCarthy’s clean, sparse prose stops The Road functioning as pure 
melodrama, but the narrative emphasis on raw emotion and heightened pathos certainly makes 
something akin to melodrama a significant generic presence in the novel, and McCarthy’s ability to 
conjure the experience of intense and overwhelming trauma in language has been widely noted in 
critical responses to the book. One of the more influential of these has been Richard Gray’s “Open 
Doors, Closed Minds: American Prose Writing at a Time of Crisis” (2008), an essay that celebrates 
The Road as one of very few novels to have succeeded in embodying artistically the moment of 
traumatic immersion experienced by Americans during and after the 9/11 attacks. Gray finds in The 
Road’s opaque and visceral apocalypse a profoundly truthful representation of trauma, whose 
fidelity to the novel’s moment in time lies precisely in its presentation of trauma’s inexpressible and 
unrepresentable nature.5 In trauma theory, and in Gray’s reading of The Road, trauma is 
overwhelming partly because, in its early stages, the traumatic event cannot be coherently 
articulated, the horror of the moment overriding and circumventing the subject’s ability to process it 
cognitively and express it in language. In order to begin moving beyond this paralysis, the 
traumatised subject must first integrate the traumatic event holistically within consciousness and 
memory, with the first step in this therapeutic process involving, therefore, bringing the trauma to 
narrative by situating it within language. For Gray, the aesthetic achievement and authentic post-




before it is brought fully to consciousness, before it can be coherently articulated or expressed, 
before it exists on any level other than as an overwhelming monolith in the experience of the 
traumatised subject. Put differently, at least as Gray sees it, it is the very absence of therapeutic 
narrative in The Road—in the form of detail about causes, contexts or explanations for the end of 
the world, say—that allows the novel to embody so profoundly the intensity of trauma that 
characterises its moment in time.  
Gray offers an important reading of The Road, but it is also a problematic reading, not least 
because, in a geopolitical context governed by the post-9/11 hegemony of American 
neoconservatism, the novel’s stalling of the reader in the immersive experience of trauma is such an 
ideologically charged move to make. The neoconservative narrative about 9/11 depends for its 
success on a very similar fixing and freezing of events within the early stages of traumatic 
experience, before the events of 9/11 can be integrated holistically into consciousness and 
articulated therapeutically in narrative. Stripped of explanatory context, post-9/11 neocon rhetoric is 
characterised instead by a compulsive return to the founding moment of trauma, to the time and 
place of the primal wound, to the morning of September 11 2001, and to the truths this new 
foundational moment tells us about the damage that terrorists and rogue states might inflict upon 
Americans. In this regard at least, neocon narrative is anti-narrative, narrative that stalls 
permanently in the original experience of trauma—just as McCarthy’s novel, its protagonists, and 
some of its readers seem gripped or transfixed within the overwhelming experience the novel so 
artfully presents. In this respect, perhaps, we might again conceive The Road less as Gray wishes to 
see it, as the authentic embodiment of a generalised moment in time, and more as an affective 








(ii) THREAT AESTHETICS 
Dominant post-9/11 structures of feeling in the United States are anchored in the affective ubiquity 
of threat. In the official narrative about the attacks that sustains the neoconservative hegemony of 
the early war on terror, threat and a heightened awareness of threat are front and centre in daily 
political discourse: the imminent threat of further terror attacks, of anthrax in envelopes and snipers 
in Washington; from terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, and from weapons of mass destruction 
in Iraq; from inscrutable enemies dressed in civilian clothes embedded in American and foreign 
populations; or from dissenting voices at home or abroad who are either “with us, or … with the 
terrorists” (Bush). Threat, and the doctrinal need to live in a state of heightened awareness of 
threat, form central planks in the structures of feeling that help secure consent for the 
neoconservative Bush Doctrine (including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ramping up of 
homeland security, and the new powers given to state agencies after 9/11), just as exposure to 
threat is part of the structure of feeling securing tacit consent for a range of other neoconservative 
measures defended at the time as pre-emptive strikes against terror: political unilateralism, the right 
to enforce regime change, extraordinary rendition, coercive interrogation, Bagram Air Base and 
Guantanamo Bay, the tactics of “shock and awe” on show in Iraq, explicitly designed as 
demonstrations of spectacular American power to deter both Iraqi resistance and future challenges 
to U.S. hegemony in the region.   
This need to live in a state of heightened sensitivity to threat is doctrinal in the fullest sense 
of the word because it is part of what makes neoconservative intellectual history distinct among 
other ideological groupings on the American Right. Key strands of this intellectual history, back into 
the early days of the Cold War, are characterised by a peculiarly paranoid, distinctively dark and 
pessimistic understanding that history should be seen as a traumatic accumulation of crises and 
catastrophes unfolding in a universe shaped by dark, unforeseen and unforeseeable threats; with a 
related understanding that the assemblage of threats confronting the U.S. over time comes from 




U.S. and without. In neoconservative intellectual history from Irving Kristol through Samuel 
Huntington to the Bush administration and the polemicists of the early post-9/11 period, the 
moment where the Other is encountered or anticipated is always the moment when the threat-
potential, or threat-level, is at its most acute.   
In an ideological climate shaped by neoconservative structures of feeling, the lived 
experience of existential threat is particularly important to securing consent for the neocon doctrine 
of pre-emptive war. Which is to say that there is a reciprocal, perhaps symbiotic relationship 
between the fear of threat on one hand, and pre-emptive responses to threats real or imagined, 
imminent or endlessly deferred, on the other. As affect theorist, Brian Massumi, puts it, “The 
security that preemption is explicitly meant to produce is predicated on its tacitly producing what it 
is meant to avoid: preemptive security is predicated on a production of insecurity to which it itself 
contributes. Preemption thus positively contributes to producing the conditions for its own exercise” 
(58). Or, as the boy and the man put it in The Road, “If you’re on the lookout all the time does that 
mean that you’re scared all the time ? / Well. I suppose you have to be scared enough to be on the 
lookout in the first place. ... Maybe you should always be on the lookout. If trouble comes when you 
least expect it then maybe the thing to do is to always expect it” (160). Or, reversing the 
comparative frame again, as Vice-President Dick Cheney put it after 9/11, “If there’s a one percent 
chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to 
treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. It’s not about our analysis, or finding a 
preponderance of evidence. It’s about our response” (qtd, Suskind 62).  
It is important, here, to stress Massumi’s understanding of the affective dimension of the 
lived experience of post-9/11 threat. The danger posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was 
real, he observes,  
 
because it was felt to be real. Whether the danger was existent or not, the menace was felt 




actual mode of existence: fear, as foreshadowing. Threat has an impending reality in the 
present. This actual reality is affective. Fear is the anticipatory reality in the present of a 
threatening future. It is the felt reality of the nonexistent, loomingly present as the affective 
fact of the matter. (53-54, his emphasis) 
  
How might we position The Road within this affective hegemony of threat, and within war on terror 
threat-politics more broadly? How might the structure and flow of the narrative, and McCarthy’s 
uses of language, embody, foster, trigger or help inculcate in readers the heightened anticipation of 
imminent threat informing post-9/11 neoconservative structures of feeling? In what ways might 
some readers find neoconservative values, or their own consent for neoconservatism, validated at 
this deep affective level of McCarthy’s prose? One way of bringing these questions together might 
be to anchor our responses in Massumi’s axiomatic observation that, when it is presented 
affectively, threat “suffuses the atmosphere,” such that “Threat is ultimately ambient” (62), and to 
note that threat becomes ambient in The Road in at least three demonstrable ways.  
First, and at the most straightforward critical level, the narrative is suffused with diegetic 
threat; meaning, simply, that threat inheres in the contents of McCarthy’s fictional world, in the 
detail comprising the literary mis-en-scène, turning landscapes and towns into a narrative canvas 
where threat is always immanent, latent or potential, in everything to which protagonists and 
readers are exposed. A canvas strewn with corpses and heads impaled on spikes, slavery, 
cannibalism, billboards threatening violent death, decaying towns and cities, dead and dying nature, 
the extreme privations of the human body deprived of shelter and food, the mounting trauma of the 
child, the agonies of the slowly dying father, each and every encounter with Others actual and real, 
anticipated and deferred; the very road on which they travel—the space that gives McCarthy’s 
diegesis its name—a space not of conventional, generic liberation in the shedding of societal 




basic critical level, in its diegetic contents or literary mis-en-scène, the structures of feeling at play in 
The Road signpost threat to the reader everywhere and in everything.  
 Second, it is also possible to identify what we might call a semiotics of threat at work in The 
Road—an organised and recurring system of signs that bonds the experience of readers closely to 
the experience of protagonists in moments of heightened alertness to threat. Throughout the novel, 
the relationship of affects the text builds with readers is mobilised in part through the often banal 
signs denoting protagonists’ heightened threat-awareness that litter the prose. This semiotics of 
threat is banal not because it is poorly executed or clichéd, but because these very plain and 
undemonstrative moments become so routine, so regular and so repetitive within the fictional 
world; so banal, in fact, that it is easy to overlook their significance in the construction and signing of 
normative experience for readers and protagonists alike. Borrowing again from Massumi, we might 
say that the repetitive regularity with which the prose throws banal signs of anxious vigilance against 
existential threat at readers “suffuses” the text in an affective atmosphere of threat that becomes 
“ultimately ambient.”6 
 Explicit signs of the imminence of actual or imagined threat are often located in vigilant acts 
of looking and listening, and The Road opens with a volley of such threat-indicators. The first thing 
the man does after the dream episode that introduces the novel is walk to the road where he 
“squatted and studied the country to the south” (2). In the proceeding fragment, “When it was light 
enough to use the binoculars he glassed the valley below” (2), with the next fragment telling us “This 
was not a safe place” (3), and the following one describing the man peering in the chrome mirror 
clamped to the cart “to watch the road behind them” (4), then scanning the wasted country and the 
empty road ahead. The regular recurrence of similar banal threat-indicators keeps the threat-level 
high throughout the novel.     
 





“watching for any sign of a fire or a lamp” (8) 
  
“he lay awake a long time listening” (14) 
 
“A blackness to hurt your ears with listening” (14) 
 
“No sign of life” (20) 
 
“He kept constant watch behind him in the mirror” (24) 
 
“he woke in the darkness to hear something coming” (27) 
 
“No tracks in the road, nothing living anywhere” (29) 
 
“He stood listening” (78) 
 
“They stood listening in the utter silence” (79) 
 
“He sat crosslegged in the leaves at the crest of a ridge and glassed the valley below them with the 
binoculars” (82) 
 
“They listened” (86) 
 
“He woke in the night and lay listening” (87) 
 





“They could find no sheltered place to make a fire that would not be seen so they made none” (91) 
 
“In the evening they tramped out across a field trying to find a place where their fire would not be 
seen” (92) 
 
“they set out back north through the woods keeping the road in view” (110) 
 
“He came upon the barn from the hill above it, stopping to watch and to listen” (124) 
 
“He stood in the door of the barn and listened” (125) 
 
“He went back to the gable and stood studying what he could see of the house” (125) 
 
“He stood in the back door and looked out at the fields and the road beyond and the bleak country 
beyond the road” (140) 
 
“Sitting back to back and watching the road” (166) 
 
“They sat for a long time. They sat on their folded blankets and watched the road in both directions” 
(167) 
 
“They sat on the embankment and waited. Nothing moved” (190) 
 






“he pulled on his shoes and rose and wrapped one of the blankets around him and walked out and 
stood looking at the road below” (208) 
 
“They sat looking out through the trees at the road” (209) 
 
“He climbed the bank through the cane to check the road” (215) 
 
“They listened but they could hear nothing” (229-30) 
 
“they’d lowered the coats of their hoods to listen” (230) 
 
These banal signs, piled incrementally and accumulating one on top of the other, are rather more 
than mere textual litter. Recurring, repeated, regular reminders to the reader that exposure to 
existential threat forms the bedrock of normative human experience are central to the novel’s 
aesthetic, and central, too, to the ideological relationship of affects between reader and text that is 
enabled and prompted by this aesthetic.   
There are other ways in which quite familiar aspects of McCarthy’s style also lend 
themselves to a semiotic threat-aesthetic that becomes ambient in The Road; for example, 
McCarthy’s fondness for writing sentences without a subject or verb, in language that registers and 
records objects in series, one after the other, so the objects themselves are picked out and 
heightened in their particularity, freed as they are from extraneous qualification in the prose.  
 
Beyond the trees the curve of a road. A long drive with dead grass. Dead ivy along a stone 





The shape of a carpet beneath the silty ash. Furniture shrouded in sheeting. Pale squares on 
the walls where paintings once had hung. … Their own shapes sectioned in the thin and 
watery glass of the window there. … A butler’s pantry where the door closed softly behind 
them. Tile floor and rows of shelves and on the shelves several dozen quart jars. … Green 
beans. Slices of red pepper standing among the ordered rows. Tomatoes. Corn. New 
potatoes. Okra (220) 
 
This very familiar McCarthyism, which heightens the gaze serially on isolated detail in the scene, 
fosters a reading experience where the eye is drawn abruptly to the contents of the object world, 
and is done so urgently, all at a rush, usually in quite short bursts of a sentence, or two, or three, 
expressing with great economy the restless, anxious movement of a highly securitised eye across 
landscapes and interiors loaded with diegetic threat.  
Third, as well as being produced at diegetic and semiotic levels, affective vulnerability to 
existential threat is also made concrete in The Road through a structured series of what, following 
Massumi, we might call “threat-events” (Massumi 60)—extended episodes during which 
protagonists and readers are exposed to sustained and heightened levels of imminent, mortal 
danger, with the agglomeration of these events into a narrative, The Road, again casting exposure to 
threat as the fundamental condition of human being in the world. Once the tone of the novel is 
established and the opening exchanges complete, we might see the remainder of the narrative as 
structured around a succession of seventeen set-piece scenes that function explicitly as threat-
events. 
One. The episode of the burned man struck by lightning, first encountered by the 
protagonists through tracks he has left in the road (50-53). Here, it is tempting to use the normative 
language of post-9/11 neoconservatism by describing the choice the man makes, in following the 
tracks, as essentially pre-emptive—he confronts and engages the threat before it can fully 




 Two. The roadrat episode, from the moment the man is woken by the sound of the truck 
until the discovery of the roadrat’s skin and bones—the first threat-event in the novel where 
imminent physical danger to the protagonists is actually and materially present (62-74).  
 Three. The episode in the small town with a mill and watertower (82-85), explicitly flagged 
as a threat-event by the man’s observations that, “We’ll have to take a risk. We need to find 
something to eat” (83).  
Four. The episode in which the man and the boy hide from the gang of cannibal roadagents 
(94-97). 
 Five. The sequence during which the man and boy are threatened by falling trees (101-103).  
 Six and seven. Two threat-events folded together, first in the discovery of tracks of a 
wheeled vehicle in the snow and alarm that “someone’s coming” (108-10), segueing into the long 
scene at the plantation house with the cannibal dungeon (111-122).  
 Eight. The discovery of the underground bunker filled with food (143-159), the initial stages 
of which emphasise both the uncertainty of the man and the anxiety of the boy. This is one of 
several threat-events that open out into transient moments of plenitude where the tension is 
abruptly released, in this instance by the discovery of the food and the absence of threatening 
‘others’ in the bunker. This ostensible relaxing of threat into plenitude, however, remains 
characterised by vigilance and a heightened alertness to danger. The man’s urgent and unsuccessful 
searching of the bunker for guns and ammunition keeps their vulnerability fully in the frame, and 
their residence is punctuated by iterative restatements of the boy’s anxiety (148, 149, 155, 157), and 
by acts of cautious looking as the man climbs the stairs, lifts the door and peers out, acutely aware, 
the narrator tells us, of how easily he might be seen by others (152).  
 Nine. The episode where the pair encounter Ely (171-185). Here again, as in the earlier 
encounter with the man struck by lightning, the father chooses to follow, engage and pre-empt the 




 Ten. The passage where three men armed with lengths of pipe step from behind a truck to 
confront the protagonists in an unnamed small town (197-98). 
 Eleven. Soon after, and independently of each other, the man and the boy both suspect they 
are being followed. They are—by three men and a pregnant woman (205-208). 
 Twelve. Immediately after this, the pair approach a campfire whose tenants have fled, and 
discover the spit-roasted child. Again, here, the choice the man makes is to engage and confront the 
potential threat before it can materialise (209-12). 
Thirteen. The episode of the house half-hidden from the road, where they again discover 
food and stay for several days (another passage that begins explicitly signed as a threat-event, 
before opening out into plenitude) (216-27). 
Fourteen. The sequence where the man explores the wrecked boat, while the boy waits on 
the beach—a threat-event that is prolonged by the simple plot-device of having the boy forget the 
revolver, meaning that the pair have to return to the vulnerable open spaces of the beach to retrieve 
it (236-49).  
 Fifteen. The episode where, having been robbed on the beach, the protagonists set out in 
pursuit of the thief (270-76). 
 Sixteen. The sequence where the pair are attacked by a man with a bow and arrow in an 
unnamed port town, and the father is wounded (280-89).  
Seventeen. The conclusive episode after the death of the man, where the boy, bereft and 
alone, is confronted by the stranger on the road (300-306).   
Despite the feelings of ambient threat that suffuse the narrative, the episode where the man 
is injured by the arrow is only the second time in the whole book that the protagonists are 
confronted with actual, imminent, physical violence—the other instance being the earlier encounter 
with the roadrat. The important thing here, of course, is that the reciprocal and ideological 
relationship between affective threat and pre-emption means that threats do not need to be real in 




everyday life. In neoconservative structures of feeling, “the affective fact of the matter” does not 
require a referent in order to be factual (Massumi 54). As Massumi suggests, when gauging the 
truth-value of heightened neoconservative states of threat, the measure of a threat-alert’s 
correctness  
 
is the immediacy and specificity of the preemptive actions it automatically triggers. The 
value of the alert is measured by its performance. Rather than referential truth-value, it has 
performative threat-value. More than any correspondence between its semantic content 
and an objective referent, it is the performed commensurability of the threat and the 





(iii) ENTROPY, VIRTUE, TRUTH AND POWER 
The distinctive, neoconservative sense that social experience is a traumatic accumulation of crises 
and catastrophes unfolding in a universe shaped by dark and unforeseen threats, is informed by a 
particular understanding of how history works. The chronic condition of history in the political 
philosophy of Leo Strauss, the thinker most commonly identified as the primary intellectual 
influence on late twentieth and early twenty-first century neoconservatism, is a corrosive state of 
advanced entropy. More specifically, in Strauss entrenched entropy is the chronic condition of 
modern western liberalism, a political tradition whose roots Strauss traces back not to the 
Enlightenment or the revolutions of the eighteenth century, but all the way back to the ancients, 
particularly Greece, and especially Plato in whom Strauss finds the most highly developed model of 
natural rights and civic virtue in all canons of political philosophy. For Strauss, western modernity, 




tradition, brought about, he contends, by the spread of permissive egalitarianism and pernicious 
doctrines of universal rights and entitlements, and above all by the corrosive influence of relativism 
in all its forms (under whose influence Strauss suggests we witness the destruction of moral truth, 
and with it the destruction of virtue) (Strauss, “Political Philosophy” and “Crisis”). From this base, 
Strauss sets out to uncover the traditions in modern liberal thought that lead us to this point, using 
the classical political philosophy of the ancients as a yardstick against which to measure the poverty 
of twentieth century liberalism. As another key figure in neoconservative intellectual history, Irving 
Kristol, would later put it, Strauss  
 
turned one’s intellectual universe upside down. Suddenly, one realized that one had been 
looking at the history of Western political thought through the wrong end of the telescope. 
Instead of looking down at them from the high vantage point of our more ‘advanced’ era, he 
trained his students to look at modernity through the eyes of the ‘ancients’ and the 
premoderns, accepting the premise that they were wiser and more insightful than we are. ... 
[O]ne read them in order to understand ourselves, products of the modern age, better than 
we were able to do so on our own.” (8)   
  
The legacies of Strauss are clear in post-9/11 neoconservative polemic like Lawrence Kaplan 
and William Kristol’s The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission (2003), where 
moral relativism is equated with the weak and apologetic Americanism of Bill Clinton, and where the 
absolute moral virtue of the Bush Doctrine is guaranteed because it derives from “our founding 
values” (Kaplan and Kristol passim), and thus from a virtuous moment in history before the corrosive 
entropy of moral relativism sets in. The original moment of pure, absolute virtue is different here—
in Strauss it is ancient Greece, in Kaplan and Kristol it is “our founding values”— but the argument 




other end of the telescope,” using the wisdom of moral absolutes from a more virtuous past to 
gauge the wisdomlessness and virtuelessness of a present mired in relativism.   
Entrenched entropy is also the chronic condition of the world in The Road—a world, 
McCarthy tells us, in one of the book’s more widely-quoted passages, now “shrinking down about a 
raw core of parsible entities. The names of things slowly following those things into oblivion. Colors. 
The names of birds. Things to eat. Finally the names of things one believed to be true”; a world 
“Drawing down like something trying to preserve heat. In time to wink out forever” (93).7 Entropy is 
also entrenched in the novel aesthetically: presented thematically in the novel’s discussion of 
language and memory fading from the world; evoked generically (or perhaps meta-generically) in 
the implicit exhaustion of the ‘road’ narrative and—in the novel’s refusal of revelation—in the 
hollowing out of apokalypsis; and figured formally in the absence of chapter breaks, so that the 
narrative becomes a single structure or aesthetic pulse winding slowly down to an end. Entropy is 
also entrenched in the narrative in the other writers McCarthy appears self-consciously to echo, 
whose work appears intertextually, sedimented into his own apocalypse—Eliot’s wasteland, 
Fitzgerald’s valley of ashes, the end of the world landscape (and the trout) from the opening to 
Hemingways’s “Big Two Hearted River,” in all three of which, as in The Road, modernity means the 
obliteration of the past in a sterile culture where language is shattered and memory is fading, 
fragmented or illusory.8  
Given its extended meditation on entropy and sterility on one hand, and the Pulitzer Prize-
winning quality of its prose on the other, it may be tempting to ascribe something analogous to 
Strauss’s re-telescoping of history to those shifts in register that punctuate McCarthy’s prose in The 
Road. Longer term readers of McCarthy will be familiar with these shifts. They have shaped his style 
for decades, in the juxtaposition of sparse, flat realism with words, phrases or entire passages 
sketched in his signature borrowings from the King James Bible, Melville and Faulkner. In The Road, 
the contrast between what is conventionally described as McCarthy’s plain style and his high style is 




that has increasingly shaped his writing from the Border Trilogy onward. When the high style arrives 
in The Road, then, it does so in particularly obtrusive, disjunctive ways. “Cannonading” (49). 
“Rachitic” (65). “Catamites” (96). “Mendicant” (133). “Envacuuming” (204). “Something nameless in 
the night, lode or matrix. To which he and the stars were common satellite. Like the great pendulum 
in its rotunda scribing through the long day movements of the universe of which you may say it 
knows nothing and yet know it must” (14).   
 These fragments of arcane language and phrasing are carefully chosen and placed. They add 
linguistic weight and depth to the prose, and they generate intellectual effects as well as sentimental 
affects among readers. Most important, perhaps, is the simple quality of pastness they invoke, the 
sense of belonging to a time that is undefined and open-ended, but whose significance lies less in its 
historical specificity or lack of it than in the contrast it provides with a narrative present 
characterised by cultural sterility and linguistic entropy. Dropped into this context, McCarthy’s 
arcana approximate a return to a moment where language itself feels richer, more complex, more 
cultured, more capable of carrying truth, and therefore in Straussian terms more capable of 
embodying virtue, with the arcana opening sink holes in the text, draining entropy from the now of 
the narrative as the reader is gripped, momentarily, by a linguistic remnant or trace—a reverse 
telescoping out of an acculturated present back into a past of nuance and sophistication—against 
which the poverty of the present might again be felt with particular intensity and force.  
 In the hands of other writers, this affective bringing of the trauma of linguistic entropy to 
language might signal the onset of some form of therapeutic movement in the prose, as the 
paralysing event or process is integrated into narrative. In McCarthy, however, the telescoping of 
history invoked in the arcana of The Road merely reconfirms the paralysis of the world in relativism 
posed in the preceding novel, No Country for Old Men, where Sheriff Bell’s description of recent 
American experience as a process of traumatic decline prompted by the erosion of older moral 
frameworks sounds at times like an almost parodic reworking of main currents in neoconservative 




vision of history as catastrophic entropy and social rupture, and even less to disagree with in the 
insistent moral clarity of the Sheriff’s world view.  
 Bell’s confidence in the persistence of robust moral absolutes is complicated somewhat by 
the distinctive sense of moral paralysis or seizure built into the deep structures of No Country for Old 
Men—a structure of feeling that derives, in part, from the unspoken exercise in intellectual 
relativism that underpins the relationship between Bell and Anton Chigurh. One of the main 
structural principles around which the narrative is built is the paralleling of Bell’s and Chigurh’s 
respective codes for living. On one hand, Bell says “People anymore you talk about right and wrong 
they’re liable to smile at you. But I never had a lot of doubts about things like that” (158-59); on the 
other, Carson Wells describes Chigurh as a man with “principles. Principles that transcend money or 
drugs or anything like that” (153). On one hand, Carla Jean asks Bell “Is your word good”, and Bell 
gives “my word” no harm will come to Moss from him (214); on the other, when Chigurh tells Carla 
Jean he’s come to kill her, he says it’s because he gave his “word” that he would (255). And where 
Chigurh claims to live what he calls “a simple life” (177), Bell says he set out to live his “in the 
strictest way I knew how” (282).  
The relationship between Bell’s and Chigurh’s very different applications of similar sounding 
values is highly problematic in No Country for Old Men, because while Bell’s narrative offers a 
sustained moral critique of Chigurh, the sheriff’s point of view is itself repeatedly ironized and 
undermined in the text; a procedure that is under way as early as the opening sentence of the novel, 
where the lawman presented to us as the notional antithesis of the killer talks to the reader about 
the part he played in sending a “boy to the gaschamber at Huntsville” (3). This ironising of Bell’s 
voice helps reinforce further the parity, of sorts, that the novel appears to propose between the 
alternative versions of the same values espoused by the two men. The novel stops short of openly 
positing a moral equivalence between Bell and Chigurh, but it does offer us two different versions of 
essentially the same thing, both of which claim to be universally true, and both of which are 




other. Amid the carnage of No Country for Old Men, the real horror of the text, a trauma that is built 
into the deep structures of the novel as well as the language spoken by the main protagonists, is a 
horror at the very possibility of moral equivalence suggested by these parallels in the 
characterisation—a very neoconservative horror, perhaps, at what Strauss describes as “nihilistic” 
doctrines of liberal relativism, according to which good and evil are not absolutes in a fixed, vertical 
hierarchy of values, but fluid things, social constructs, in a broad and open-ended horizontal play of 
difference.  
This neoconservative figuring of the paralysing trauma of liberal relativism stands in a 
conflicted, and sometimes contradictory relationship with a major fissure in Straussian ideology that 
can be traced forward, again, into the politics of the war on terror neocons, and that is also 
embodied aesthetically in the fictional catastrophe of The Road—an awkward tension or balancing 
act between the virtuous truth of moral absolutes on one hand, and pure relational pragmatism on 
the other. This fissure reveals itself with particular clarity in the context of what Strauss thought of 
as ‘noble lies’ (Strauss, “The City”), an idea he extrapolates (problematically) from Plato, and that 
contemporary neoconservatives extrapolate in turn from Strauss.  
In Straussian political theory the need for noble lies derives from the relationships posited 
between wisdom, truth, virtue and power. For Strauss, only the truly wise—meaning those capable 
of knowing absolute truth—are capable of governing virtuously, and so power and privilege accrue 
to educated elites as a matter of natural right (Strauss, “Liberal Education”). The uneducated mob, 
lacking both the wisdom required to understand truth and the ability to act virtuously in the face of 
it, must be shielded from truth, partly for their own good, but also in the interests of preserving the 
stability and integrity of the metropolis, both of which may be threatened if alarming truths are 
made openly accessible to the wisdomless and the virtueless. In Straussian theory, therefore, 
governing elites can lie to their people with impunity in the name of defending truth (and virtue, and 




The noble lie is also necessary, in Strauss, to bulwark the virtue of the wise. Their wisdom is 
itself an absolute truth, because it gives the wise their natural right to a place at the top of the pile, 
and therefore to a hegemony that is to be defended at all costs and by any means necessary, 
including the telling of lies to a populace unable to cope with truth. In Straussian political 
philosophy, then, lies are necessary to secure truth, and the defence of absolute values demands the 
practising of moral pragmatism—propositions that critics of the Bush administration have suggested 
inform the neoconservative narrative about 9/11 and the war on terror in a variety of ways. In the 
exaggeration of imminent terror threats, for example, signalled publicly in the raising of colour-
coded “threat-levels”; in the characterisation of the attacks as a hatred of American values, rather 
than American foreign policy, and as an Islamist “will to power”; in the calculated campaign led by 
the White House to link 9/11 to Saddam Hussein, and in the claims about weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq; in the gathering of these virtuous lies together in a rhetoric of national mission 
that might bond Americans together, at least in Straussian terms, into a unified, stable and cohesive 
mass (where the telling of unblemished truths, instead, would cause discord, dismay, disharmony, 
dissent).  
How might we trace this awkward, but ostensibly noble balancing of moral pragmatism and 
absolute virtue in The Road? The story the father tells the child, and the story he tells himself, about 
good guys carrying the fire, might be one place to begin. In an amoral universe transformed by the 
trauma of the apocalypse and the final stages of catastrophic entropy, the trope of good guys 
carrying the fire seems rather empty, an archaic hangover from character types and moral codes 
that no longer have relevance or meaning. But if good guys carrying the fire is a fabrication or a lie, it 
is a lie with distinctly noble aims, and it is an idea that has considerable Straussian traction in the 
narrative. It helps keep the child going when the truth might cause him to falter, and it feeds and 
reinforces the cohesion of the bond between the man and the boy.     
 More interesting, perhaps, because it is pervasive in both The Road and in post-9/11 




relationship between the man and the boy generally. It is commonly assumed that because the boy 
is presented to us by the man as a figure of virtue and redemption, then it must be the boy that 
functions as the moral core of the novel. This is a persuasive argument, not least because it meshes 
neatly with moments in McCarthy’s earlier work; particularly, perhaps, from the Border Trilogy, 
where, if redemption exists at all, it may do so in those small acts of kindness and moments of 
generosity to others that certainly seem in a lineage of some kind with the post-apocalyptic civic 
virtue of the boy in The Road, as he repeatedly protests the man’s reluctance to give aid and 
assistance to others. Viewed through a prism shaped by neoconservative, war on terror structures of 
feeling, however, it might be that the moral centre of the book lies not in the boy, but in the man; or 
at least, in the sometimes tense and conflicted space between the two of them, as they negotiate 
and disagree on the competing demands of a fluid morality driven by self-referential survivalism, 
and the virtuous truth of extending help to others (while not eating people or dogs). If we accept 
Richard Gray’s persuasive suggestion that The Road is a novel characterised above all by its authentic 
historicity—a quality that this essay has interpreted rather differently, as a frame of reference 
infused with neoconservative structures of feeling—we might argue that it is not the boy’s virtuous 
objections to the pragmatism of the man that form the moral core of The Road, but the man’s 
overriding of those objections in the facing down of existential threats. The boy may be presented to 
us from the outset as the embodiment of something akin to pure virtue, but without the pure 
pragmatism of the man that keeps him alive the “word of God” the boy is said to embody (3) cannot 
be defended, secured and delivered at the end of the book. Without pragmatism, and thus without 
moral relativism, there is no absolute truth. Without pure self-interest there is no virtue, and no civic 
virtue. Without the morality of the man, at the end of the story there is no boy, and the traumatic 
process of entropy is complete.9  
Just as the politics of affect in The Road might, for some readers, have chimed harmoniously 
with key pillars of neoconservative narrative about 9/11—the opacity of apocalyptic disaster, the 




pre-emptive responses to terror—so too, then, might readers familiar with, and predisposed to 
positions taken in neoconservative intellectual history generally, have found much they instinctively 
agreed with in the discourses of entropy, virtue and truth framing The Road. Contextualised 
historically, there are all manner of ways of reading The Road as a counter-hegemonic or liberal text. 
It might be viewed as a deep-ecology fable about the planet’s rejection of the human race. It can be 
seen as a warning about nuclear proliferation. It has been read as a refusal of American 
exceptionalism, a critique of consumer capitalism, and in its hollowing out of the generic road 
narrative it can certainly be seen as a meditation on the mutability of mainstream American 
iconography and popular culture. In each of these readings, and in many possible others, The Road is 
a novel that can accommodate in quite straightforward ways the liberal politics that liberal readers 
might bring with them to the act of reading the book. Viewed through the prism of the 
neoconservative hegemony in which it is written, first published and read, however, this essay has 
suggested that The Road also offers other readers multiple opportunities to discover, affirm, or 
engage their post-9/11 neoconservatism, either cognitively or affectively, at or beyond what 
Raymond Williams calls “the very edge of semantic availability” (134). A second suggestion then 
follows: that the temptation among liberal critics to default to readings of the novel that simply map 
to and reflect their own liberal sensibilities may facilitate a misunderstanding of the variegated ways 
in which McCarthy’s audiences read, while closing down the complex, ambiguous, and sometimes 
discomforting relationships the text displays with the ideological hegemony of the time. Across the 
political and cultural spectrum, the temper of the post-9/11 period was often one of intense 
revisionism. Another suggestion this essay has tried to make is that the fiction of Cormac McCarthy, 
and the assumptions sometimes made about his readership, should not necessarily be immune from 













1 For discussion of The Road in the context of 9/11, see Richard Gray, Nell Sullivan, Dianne C. Luce, Francisco 
Collado-Rodríguez, and Kristjan Mavri.  
2 Matthew Mullins finds apocalyptic “revelation” in The Road in precisely these terms (76). See also Linda 
Townley Woodson’s suggestion that The Road is generically “post-apocalyptic” partly because it embodies 
“Wordsworth’s sense of the heightened vision of the artist” (“Mapping” 87).   
3 As Ashley Kunsa notes, “the reader has greater access to the father’s thoughts than to those of any other 
McCarthy character” (62). On memory and nostalgia in The Road, see Marie-Reine Pugh, Laura Gruber 
Godfrey, and Patrick Damien O’Connor.  
4 Andrew Hoberek refers to McCarthy’s “terse Hemingwayesque” prose in The Road (488), and discusses the 
novel’s interplay of Faulknerian ‘high’ style and Hemingwayesque ‘flat’ style (491-97). 
5 See also Collado-Rodríguez, who describes the condition examined in both The Road and No Country for Old 
Men as one of structural trauma. Pairing the novels in this way yields some fascinating insights—for example, 
both the boy in the former and Sheriff Bell in the latter are said to display classic signs of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD).  
6 As Hannah Stark notes, The Road unfolds in a “context of constant surveillance” where “looking occupies a 
central place,” and in which “The man and the boy are repeatedly described as observing their world” (75). 
7 In O’Connor’s reading of The Road, “McCarthy certainly thinks there is human participation in something 
larger than ourselves. However, that something greater is the material negation of the universe. … Basically, all 
systems, anything that exists, including the universe, progressively devolves into a state of disorder. … To 
understand McCarthy, it is necessary to see humans as in some way participating in this type of interminable 
destruction” (3).   
8 On modernity as a condition of crisis and collapse in The Road, see Matthew Mullins, and Ty Hawkins. For a 
penetrating analysis of modernity as a destructive agency in McCarthy generally, see Nicholas Monk. Critics to 
have noted The Road’s detailed intertexuality with Hemingway include Russell M. Hillier, “‘Each the Other’s 
World’” (671), Kenneth Lincoln (173), Julian Murphet (112-13), and Kenneth K. Brandt. References to the 
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Genesis and the Book of Job. Murphet, and Hunt and Jacobsen, also discuss The Road’s intertextuality with 
Plato.    
9 On moral and ethical frameworks in The Road, see Patrick Damien O’Connor, Christopher Pizzino, and Rick 
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